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Two potential forms of mutation in cultural evolution have been identified: ‘copying error’, 
where learners make random modifications to a behaviour and ‘guided variation’ where learners 
makes non-random modifications. While copying error is directly analogous to genetic mutation, 
guided variation is a specifically cultural process that does not have a close parallel in biological 
evolution. It has been suggested that the decision-making processes underlying intentional 
guided variation may produce similar results to cultural transmission as both are likely to be 
influenced by cognitive biases. This study uses a unique linear transmission chain design, without 
any influence of recall, to examine intentional guided variation. Participants were asked to alter 
news stories however they wished in order to make them more interesting, the product of their 
modification was then passed to the next participant and so on down the chain. The products of 
the chains were then compared with the original material so as to assess any underlying biases 
in the changed content. Through this process of guided variation, original material which scored 
low for bias-exploiting content significantly increased in at least one known content bias, 
whereas original material which scored high for bias-exploiting content was not significantly 
altered in this respect.
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Introduction
Recent research has shown that false news spreads more widely online than genuine news (Vosoughi, Roy 
& Aral, 2018) but offers little explanation as to why. Cultural evolution theory proposes that culture repre-
sents a second system of heritable variation that evolves through Darwinian processes of mutation, selection 
and inheritance (Mesoudi, 2011, Richerson & Boyd, 2005) and offers an excellent theory through which we 
can examine how processes in individuals result in population level patterns. As such a Cultural Evolution 
approach provides a useful means to understanding the socio-cognitive mechanisms behind the spread of 
misinformation (Acerbi, 2016). 
To date, most theoretical and empirical work in Cultural Evolution has focused on the processes of 
 selection and inheritance (see Kendal et al., 2018 for a review). For example, researchers have used a range 
of methods, from mathematical modelling (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1985) and controlled experiments (Wood, 
Kendal & Flynn, 2013) to ethnographic fieldwork (Henrich & Broesch, 2011), to investigate how one makes 
decisions about what to copy (‘content biases’) and who to copy (‘context biases’). Other researchers, mean-
while, have employed techniques of phylogenetic analysis to trace lineages of cultural descent and modifica-
tion in various socially learned traditions (e.g. Currie, 2013; Lycett, 2009; Lyman & O’Brien, 2003; Tehrani, 
2013; Tehrani, Collard & Shennan, 2010), and establish long-term trends in cultural, economic and political 
systems (e.g. Jordan, Gray, Greenhill & Mace, 2009). However, comparatively little research has been carried 
out on the processes of cultural mutation, and to what extent this process may reflect the characteristics of 
others. The present study aims to shed more light on this problem by examining processes of innovation in 
cultural science
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artificially generated narrative traditions. Previous research in innovation and creativity in cultural evolution 
has primarily focused on problem solving or technological applications (see Fogarty, Creanza & Feldman, 
2015 for a review), as such this study represents a novel examination of innovation in narrative transmission. 
Current theory (e.g. Mesoudi, 2011) suggests there are two main mechanisms of cultural mutation. The 
first of these is copying error, which is defined as the random, non-intentional modification of a demon-
strated behaviour. Copying error can result when a learner is less adept than a model (for example, the father 
of the bride attempting to imitate Michael Jackson’s ‘moonwalk’ at his daughter’s wedding party), due to an 
accidental mishap (a pianist accidentally hitting the wrong key during a performance), or as a consequence 
of the constraints of the human perceptual system (for example, believing two lines to be the same length 
when they are not). An example of the latter is provided by Eerkens and Lipo’s (2005) case study of Paleo-
Indian projectile points from Owens Valley, California between 1500 and 650 BCE. They demonstrated that 
patterns of variance and cumulative change in these projectile point forms is consistent with a model of 
pure copying error derived from research into shape perception, which shows that humans are unable to 
discriminate between line lengths that differ by less than 3% (known as the Weber Fraction), regardless 
of scale. The second mechanism for generating cultural variation is known as ‘guided variation’ (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985), which involves the non-random modification of a demonstrated behaviour by the learner. 
For example, someone may be taught how to cook a particular dish, and decide to alter the recipe to make 
it tastier or healthier by adding or substituting ingredients. This non-random modification can occur in 
both unintentional and intentional forms and also occur through learning processes such as trial-and-error 
(Mesoudi, 2013).
Whereas copying error is directly analogous to random mutation in genetics, guided variation is a specifi-
cally cultural process that does not have a close parallel in biological evolution. Goal-directed guided varia-
tion allows individuals to take short-cuts to solving adaptive problems that would take several generations 
to solve under pure natural selection. As Richerson and Boyd stated, guided variation is “like an imaginary 
genetic system in which mutations tend to be fitness-enhancing, rather than random” (2005: 116). They 
further suggest that the decision-making processes underlying guided variation may often produce similar 
results to biased cultural transmission because both are likely to be based on the same psychological mecha-
nisms (ibid). 
To date, only one study has directly tested whether traditions that evolve through guided variation exhibit 
the same dynamics as traditions that evolve through biased cultural transmission. Mesoudi (2008), inspired 
by Bettinger and Eerkens’ (1999) classic archaeological analysis of variation in arrow-head designs in pre-
historic Nevada and California, used an artificial hunting experiment to compare the evolution of virtual 
arrow-head designs under guided variation (in this case intentional modification informed by individual 
trial-and-error learning) versus a transmission bias for copying successful individuals. He found that inten-
tional guided variation can produce similar outcomes to biased cultural transmission, but only under spe-
cific circumstances (i.e. when there is a single best variant of a particular behaviour). However, it is important 
to emphasise that the study focused specifically on context-based transmission biases. Context bias describes 
when the likelihood of cultural trait being transmitted is determined by its context or features of the model 
(i.e. conformist bias, where individuals copy the most common behaviour, or prestige bias where individu-
als copy prestigious models). This is distinct from content bias where the likelihood of a cultural trait being 
transmitted is determined by the intrinsic features of the material or behaviour itself. To date, no similar 
studies have examined whether guided variation exhibits the same dynamics as content-based transmission 
biases. The present research presents a study designed to address this gap. 
Cognitive content biases in intentional guided variation have particular relevance to electronic communi-
cation as, unlike traditional forms of communication, electronic media potentially allows for the error-free 
replication of information. Despite this, however, electronic communication does not demonstrate perfect 
replication. Facebook status updates, for example, show a moderately high “mutation” rate of 11% and 
resemble an iterative, imperfect replication process, likely due to people deliberately altering the infor-
mation before transmitting it themselves (Adamic et al., 2014). Previous research examining the cultural 
evolution and transmission of narratives and text have used transmission chain experiments in an attempt 
to replicate unintentional guided variation and have found evidence for the influence of content biases 
across three phases of transmission; choosing to receive, encoding and recall, and choosing to transmit 
(see Stubbersfield, Flynn & Tehrani, 2017 for a review). Only a small number have examined these phases 
separately (Eriksson & Coultas 2014, and Stubbersfield, Tehrani & Flynn, 2015). As such it is difficult to 
determine to what extent the role of content biases in selective recall plays in transmission and, therefore, 
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how relevant these previous studies are to the transmission of content in electronic communication. As the 
issues presented by “Fake News” and other forms of information become increasingly prevalent, it becomes 
increasingly important to understand the transmission processes involved in electronic communication. 
This study represents a useful first step towards adapting traditional experimental paradigms to be more 
relevant towards contemporary electronic communication and therefore be relevant to contemporary issues 
in electronic communication. 
The Present Research
This study seeks to examine how modification through intentional guided variation may reflect the modi-
fication through unintentional guided variation demonstrated in previous studies. In particular, to what 
extent processes of intentional modification are influenced by the content biases which have been shown 
to influence unintentional modification. The term ‘content bias’ is used here to refer to the psychological 
concept of cognitive predispositions towards attending to, encoding in memory and transmitting to others 
certain types of information over equivalent others. It is therefore not directly related to similar terms from 
other fields within cultural, social and human sciences, such as ideological or political bias. While other 
biases such as political and ideological biases of course play an important role in the transmission of narra-
tives and in particular misinformation and false news online, this study focuses on those cognitive content 
biases which have been identified in previous research from within the fields of psychology and cogni-
tive anthropology: an ecological survival information bias (Stubbersfield, et al., 2015), a social information 
bias (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006); an emotional bias (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001; Stubbersfield, 
Tehrani & Flynn, 2017), a minimally counter-intuitive (MCI) bias (Boyer & Ramble, 2001), and a stereotype 
consistency bias (Kashima, 2000). Ecological survival information bias suggests that, as human memory has 
evolved to be ‘tuned’ towards encoding and recalling ecological information related to survival and fitness 
better than other forms of information, humans will be biased towards ecological information relevant to 
survival (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008). While social information bias suggests that, as humans evolved greater 
intelligence in order to deal with complex social interactions they will be biased towards information related 
to social interaction (Mesoudi et al., 2006). Content which evokes a greater emotional response has been 
shown to grant a mnemonic advantage in individual recall tests (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006) and content eliciting 
a greater level of disgust has been shown to have an advantage in cultural transmission (Eriksson & Coultas, 
2014; Heath et al., 2001; Stubbersfield, Tehrani & Flynn, 2015); such emotional content bias suggests that 
humans are biased in transmission towards content that evokes a greater emotional response. MCI bias sug-
gests that humans are biased towards content which meets a cognitively optimal balance between a small 
number of counter-intuitive concepts which breach category level expectations (of folk physics, folk biology 
etc.) and a majority of intuitive concepts (Boyer, 1994). Stereotype consistency bias suggests that humans are 
biased towards content which is consistent with these cultural stereotypes (Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000) 
(see Stubbersfield, et al., 2017, for a review of the biases). 
The study uses a paradigm adapted from the linear transmission chain design. Primarily developed by 
Bartlett (1932) to examine schema in memory, a traditional linear transmission chain design involves mate-
rial being given to the first participant who then have to reproduce the material from memory, which 
becomes the material for the second participant in the chain, a process repeated down the ‘chain’ of partici-
pants (resembling the children’s game “broken telephone”). This is a paradigm which has previously been 
used successfully to examine content biases in recall-based transmission (see Stubbersfield et al., 2017), here 
the paradigm is adapted in a novel way by not relying on reproduction through recall but instead by asking 
participants to alter the material however they wished. This novel paradigm therefore more closely repli-
cates the ‘creative transmission’ seen in electronic communication. The nature of this paradigm means that 
the guided variation studied here is explicitly goal-directed and intentional and as such is not representative 
of all forms of guided variation, some of which may feature unintentional but non-random modification. In 
this sense, the guided variation studied here is similar to the version presented by Claidière, Scott-Phillips 
and Sperber (2014), who describe it as a constructive mental process which imaginatively anticipates the 
effects of a modification, (‘cultural attraction’). The study addressed two key questions:
1. Will the product of intentional guided variation reflect the content biases demonstrated in recall-based 
experiments such as transmission chains and memory tests?
2. Will the choices made by participants when altering the material reflect the choices made by  participants 
in ‘choose-to-transmit’-based experiments? 
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Ethics Statement
All participants provided informed consent. Ethical approval was granted by the Research Ethics and 
Data Protection Committee, Department of Anthropology, University of Durham. All student participants 
were recruited through the psychology department recruitment scheme and compensated with course 
credits.
Methods
This study involved three distinct phases using different participants in each stage. In Stage 1, participants 
rated four news stories for various criteria related to their content. Stage 2 took the form of a linear trans-
mission chain where participants were allowed to alter the original material however they wished without 
having to recall it. In Stage 3 participants rated the material that was produced by the transmission chains 
using the same questionnaire as Stage 1. For the results the data from the Stage 1 and Stage 3 questionnaires 
are compared. The methodological details of each stage are provided below. 
Stage 1
Participants 
Eleven participants (10 female) aged 18 to 25 years (M = 20, SD = 2.05) participated. All participants were 
students at the University of Durham.
Materials 
Four news stories were collected from the BBC News website (www.bbc.co.uk/news/); two were expected 
to exploit content biases to a greater degree (high-pea and high-tiger) than the other two (low-bridge and 
low-trees) providing two groups of stories low-exploit and high-exploit. Material which was likely to vary in 
terms of content bias exploitation was selected to allow us to examine if the process of intentional modifi-
cation is a general additive process or if they would be altered differently. One story (low-trees) describes a 
plan to plant thousands of trees on a Cumbrian fell to boost numbers of black grouse. Another (low-bridge) 
describes delays on the Kessock Bridge at Inverness due to two lorries carrying abnormal loads. Another 
(high-pea) describes an incident in Massachusetts where a man was found to have a pea plant growing in 
his lung. The fourth story (high-tiger) describes an incident where a US police sniper sedated a tiger found 
in a Harlem apartment. These stories were presented as narratives without headlines (see supplementary 
material (SM) 1). Questionnaires collected data on emotional content, plausibility, relevance, survival infor-
mation, social information and gender stereotypes (see SM2). In each case they were asked to rate the 
stories for content on a 1–7 Likert scale. Participants were asked to state which emotion or emotions they 
felt while reading this story. This was a free response but examples of potential emotions were provided. 
These example emotions (interest, joy, anger,  surprise, sadness, contempt, fear, disgust) are taken from 
Ekman’s (1992) list of Basic Emotions with the addition of interest and contempt, which were included as 
they have previously been found to influence the transmission of anecdotes (see Peters, Kashima and Clark, 
2009). See SM2 for the full questionnaire. The order of stories presented was counterbalanced to avoid 
order effects. 
Procedure 
Each participant read the material and completed a questionnaire for each of the four stories. The same set 
of five questions was asked for each of the stories presented. The questions were related to emotional con-
tent, plausibility, relevance, survival information, social information and gender stereotypes. Questions 2–5 
involved participants rating the content of the story on a seven point Likert scale (see SM 2).
Stage 2
Participants  
Thirty participants (21 female) aged 19 to 40 years (M = 21.67, SD = 4.2) participated. All participants were 
students at the University of Durham.
Design  
A linear transmission chain design was used, however, unlike traditional transmission chain paradigms, par-
ticipants were not required to recall material but were asked to alter the material as they wished. Each of the 
ten chains comprised of three participants or ‘generations’. Three generations have been used successfully 
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in diffusion chains in previous research (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Nielsen, Cucchiaro & Mohamedally, 2012; 
Stubbersfield, Tehrani & Flynn, 2015, 2017). 
Materials  
The material presented to the first generation was the same as that used in Stage 1. 
Procedure  
Participants were asked to take part in a study regarding the cultural transmission of narratives. Participants 
were individually presented with the experimental materials on a computer. The participants were given the 
following written instructions: 
‘Please edit the story to make it as interesting as possible, so that another person would be likely to 
tell it to a friend. You have complete freedom to alter the story however you wish but please change 
at least two aspects of the story.’
Participants were asked to change at least two aspects of the story to ensure that some changes were made. 
This was repeated for each story presented to them. 
Stage 3
Participants   
One-hundred participants (81 female) aged 17 to 39 years (M = 20.48, SD = 3.89) participated. The  majority 
(87) of participants were students at the University of Durham. Non-students were recruited through 
 opportunity sampling.
Materials   
The material used in this stage was that produced by the final generations of Stage 2. The questionnaire was 
the same as Stage 1. 
Procedure   
Each participant completed the questionnaires online. Each version of each story (ten chains for each story 
led to ten versions of each story, totalling 40 final stories) was rated by ten participants (each participant 
rating four stories). 
Results
Before Transmission
Significant variation was found between the news stories in emotional content (Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
ANOVA, χ23 = 20.76, p < .001), plausibility (χ
2
3 = 15.02, p < .005), survival information (χ
2
3 = 15.12, p < .005) 
and gender stereotype consistent behaviour (χ23 = 11.67, p < .01). Pairwise comparisons using Dunn’s (1964) 
procedure were used to examine the differences between individual stories. It was found that low-trees and 
low-bridge stories scored significantly lower than high-pea and high-tiger in emotional content (ps < .05). 
Low-trees scored significantly higher than high-pea in plausibility (p < .005). Low-bridge scored significantly 
lower than high-pea in survival information (p < .005). High-tiger scored significantly higher in gender 
stereotyped behaviour than low-trees (p < .005). See Table 1 the mean ratings for each news story before 
transmission and SM3 for details of the significant differences between stories.
Table 1: Means and standard deviations of rating scores for each news story before transmission.
Story Mean (SD)
Emotional Plausibility Relevance Survival Social Stereotype
Trees 3.73(1.35) 6(1.1) 2.82(1.25) 2.73(1.62) 1.82(1.08) 1.36(.67)
Bridge 3.36(1.57) 4.91(1.87) 1.91(1.45) 1.91(1.22) 2.36(1.03) 1.91(.83)
Pea 5.55(.82) 2.82(2.04) 2.36(1.63) 4.55(1.29) 2.91(1.14) 1.91(.7)
Tiger 5.36(.67) 3.82(1.6) 1.64(.92) 3.55(1.44) 2.45(1.57) 3.09(1.38)
Note: Rating scale ran 1–7. For plausibility low scores represent less plausible.
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After Transmission
Significant variation was found between the transmitted stories in emotional content (Kruskal-Wallis 
 one-way ANOVA, χ23 = 10.10, p < .05), plausibility (χ
2
3 = 22.59, p < .001), relevance (χ
2
3 = 28.47, p < .001), 
survival information (χ23 = 17.46, p < .005), social information (χ
2
3 = 25.25, p < .001) and gender stereotyped 
behaviour (χ23 = 13.74, p < .005). Dunn’s (1964) procedure for pairwise comparisons was used to  compare 
individual stories. High-pea scored significantly higher than low-trees in emotional content (p < .05). 
 Low-bridge scored significantly higher than high-pea and high-tiger in plausibility (ps < .05) and high-pea 
also scored significantly lower than high-trees in the same score (p < .005). Low-trees scored significantly 
higher than high-pea and high-tiger in relevance (ps < .001). High-pea scored significantly higher than 
 low-bridge in survival information (p < .005). Low-bridge scored significantly higher than all other stories 
in social  information (ps < .01). High-tiger scored significantly higher than low-trees and high-pea in gender 
stereotyped behaviour (ps < .05). See Table 2 the mean ratings for each news story after transmission and 
SM4 for details of the significant differences between stories.
Before and after transmission comparison
Low-Trees
The plausibility score was found to be significantly lower after transmission (Mann-Whitney U = 105, 
p < .001). No other significant differences were found (Us = 690–380, ps > .05). 
Low-Bridge 
The plausibility score was found to be significantly lower after transmission (U = 235, p < .005) and the 
social information score was found to be significantly higher (U = 782.5, p < .05). No other significant differ-
ences were found (Us = 713–584.5, ps > .05). 
High-Pea
No significant differences were found (Us = 384.5–502.5, ps > .05), although the relevance score was 
 marginally significantly different after transmission (U = 384.5, p = .051). 
High-Tiger
The emotional content score was found to be significantly lower after transmission (U = 354, p < .05) as was the 
plausibility score (U = 245.5, p < .005). No other significant differences were found (Us = 621.5–394.5, ps > .05). 
Qualitative Analyses
During coding it was observed that certain additions and changes frequently occurred and were common 
across the stories. As such a qualitative analysis was conducted using NVivo 10 (QSR International, 2012). See 
Table 3 for results. The common changes or additions considered were:
• The addition of Minimally Counterintuitive (MCI) concepts, here defined as concepts which breach 
 category level expectations of folk physics, folk biology etc. (e.g. the inclusion of magical creatures, 
superhuman abilities and sci-fi elements).
• The addition of content intended to be found amusing by the reader.
• Exaggeration of elements in the story, either simply the physical dimensions of an element (e.g. the size of 
the pea in high-pea) or an exaggeration of the story’s events (e.g. the landslide in low-trees being deadly).
• The addition of references to popular culture such as celebrities. 
• A change to the location of the story’s setting. 
Table 2: Means and standard deviations of rating scores for each news story after transmission.
Story Mean (SD)
Emotional Plausibility Relevance Survival Social Stereotype
Trees 4.18(1.38) 2.77(1.85) 2.18(1.24) 3.09(1.81) 2.51(1.45) 2.09(1.56)
Bridge 4.21(1.59) 2.89(1.83) 1.91(1.18) 2.45(1.48) 3.56(1.63) 2.39(1.59)
Pea 4.76(1.6) 1.94(1.48) 1.54(.99) 3.59(2.04) 2.66(1.7) 2.14(1.54)
Tiger 4.54(1.45) 2.20(1.57) 1.48(.77) 2.82(1.7) 2.77(1.52) 2.78(1.73)
Note: Rating scale ran 1–7. For plausibility low scores represent less plausible.
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Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the effects of intentional guided variation on the evolution of narra-
tives, in this case news stories. In particular the aim of the study was to test if the product of transmission 
based solely on individual modification rather than recall would reflect the content biases that have been 
suggested by previous research using recall-based paradigms. To do this two key questions were addressed:
1. Will the product of guided variation reflect the content biases demonstrated in recall-based experi-
ments such as transmission chains and memory tests?
2. Will the choices made by participants when altering the material reflect the choices made by partici-
pants in ‘choose-to-transmit’-based experiments?
Previous research examining unintentional guided variation using recall-based experiments such as trans-
mission chains and memory tests has given support to a number of content biases in cultural transmission 
(see Stubbersfield, Flynn & Tehrani, 2017). Emotional content bias has been demonstrated in studies based 
on recall and also the ‘choose-to-transmit’ phases of transmission (Berger & Milkman, 2010; Erikkson & 
Coultas, 2014; Heath, Bell & Sternberg, 2001; Peters, Kashima and Clark, 2009). Lyons and Kashima (2006) 
found that stereotype consistency bias only emerged in a linear transmission chain where there was com-
municative intent but did not emerge in a recall-based chain. Here, it was tested whether participants would 
enhance the degree to which material contained emotionally-arousing information, stereotypically-consist-
ent information, social information, survival information and MCI concepts.
In order to examine this, a novel ‘creative transmission chain’ paradigm was used. Participants in a linear 
transmission chain were given material (original material being an article from the BBC News website) and 
were asked to alter this material however they wished, in contrast to having to recall it as in traditional lin-
ear transmission chain experiments. Before transmission the stories were separated into two groups: those 
which were rated as more plausible but less emotive (low-trees and low-bridge) and those which were rated 
as less plausible but more emotive (high-pea and high-tiger). This allows for a comparison between the two 
groups with regards to how they are altered through guided variation. After the material had been transmit-
ted the differences in scores between the two groups was less marked. The low-exploit stories became less 
plausible and in one case (low-bridge) scores significantly increased in social information. The scores for 
the high-exploit stories were largely consistent between before and after transmission, the only significant 
change being that high-tiger’s emotion score reduced. The only story not to reduce in plausibility was high-
pea, although that story had the lowest plausibility score before transmission. 
With regards to whether the product of guided variation reflects the content biases demonstrated in 
recall-based experiments such as transmission chains and memory tests, the results suggest, where biased 
content did increase, this was consistent with the findings of recall-based experiments and is therefore 
comparable to unintentional changes in transmission. The biases that increased, social information and 
stereotyped content, have both been demonstrated in recall-based experiments. The fact that this was not 
consistent across all stories suggests that while certain biases may provide a recall advantage, both individu-
ally and cumulatively, these biases are not deliberately added or enhanced when recall is not necessary for 
transmission and may be uniquely unintentional changes made in recall-based transmission. The finding 
that stereotype consistent content increased in one story is consistent with Lyons and Kashima (2006) who 
found that this bias emerged when there was communicative intent. 
With regards to whether ‘the choices made by participants when altering the material reflect the choices 
made by participants in ‘choose-to-transmit’-based experiments, the results were not consistent with these 
Table 3: Results of the qualitative analysis. The table shows the percentage frequency common additions or 
changes made to the stories. 
Addition/Change Frequency in each story (% of stories) Frequency in 
all stories (%)Low-Trees Low-Bridge High-Pea High-Tiger
MCI content 50 40 80 40 52.5
Amusing content 60 60 50 60 57.5
Exaggeration 40 50 60 60 52.5
‘Pop culture’ 20 40 20 40 30
Location change 20 10 0 10 10
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studies. While ‘choose-to-transmit’ studies have found that more emotive content is more likely to be chosen 
to be transmitted over less emotive content (Erikkson & Coultas, 2014; Heath, Bell & Sternberg, 2001; Peters, 
Kashima and Clark, 2009), the degree to which the stories in this study evoked emotion did not alter. 
Qualitative analysis provides insight into how the stories were altered and how this may have affected 
the individual bias scores. Frequently changes were made with the apparent intention of making the story 
more amusing, in some cases using punch lines, (e.g. having a clown being taken into “CUSTARDy”). This 
is consistent with an analysis of content biases in urban legends which found amusement to be the most 
frequently evoked emotion (Stubbersfield et al., 2017). Amusement is considered by Ekman (1999) to share 
characteristics with the Basic Emotions and the addition of amusing content could be seen as an attempt 
to increase how emotive the stories are. These attempts at inducing amusement, however, did not increase 
emotion scores, suggesting that they were unsuccessful. Another common alteration was to exaggerate ele-
ments of the story, such as increasing the physical dimensions of a story element (e.g. the growth mentioned 
in high-pea is ½ an inch in the original material but became as large as three miles), or exaggerating events 
(e.g. the landslides in low-trees becoming deadly). Again, however, these exaggerations did not increase the 
evoked emotion and are likely to have reduced the plausibility score. Exaggeration of narrative elements has 
been observed in a recall-based transmission chain study, with elements becoming more explicitly violent 
(Stubbersfield, Tehrani & Flynn, 2015), suggesting that the intentional exaggeration found here is compara-
ble to unintentional changes made in recall-based transmission. 
Another common alteration that probably reduced plausibility scores was the inclusion of MCI elements 
(here defined as content which breaches category level expectations) which were found in close to half of 
the material produced by the chains. The MCI elements ranged from mythical creatures, such as unicorns, to 
more sci-fi like elements, such as space-craft or superheroes. Although this probably reduced the plausibility 
scores, the inclusion MCI elements could enhance the transmission success of the stories. The introduction 
of MCI elements (where there were none before) has not been observed in recall-based transmission studies 
suggesting that it is a unique to intentional change. The fact that MCI elements are preserved in recall-based 
transmission, however, suggests that this intentional inclusion of MCI elements reflects cognitive biases or 
an unconscious appeal to cognitive biases. Other, less frequently observed changes reflect tropes commonly 
seen in urban legends. These include references to popular culture, references to celebrities such as actor 
Charlie Sheen and location changes. The introduction of celebrities appears to reflect social information 
bias. By introducing real people likely to be known to the reader, the author increases the social relevance of 
the information provided in the narrative, thereby exploiting social information bias. 
An unexpected result of the study was that there was not a general increase in the biased content across 
all stories. Instead it was found that only one exploit-low story showed an increase in biased content and 
that this was not across all biases. This story only increased in social information but in a number of exam-
ples both low-exploit and high-exploit stories had MCI elements added to them. One might expect guided 
variation to work in a similar manner to traditional recall-based transmission and enhance how transmis-
sible the material is by increasing all biases. However, an analysis of urban legends found that even in nar-
ratives which have been transmitted multiple times in an online environment the majority only exploited 
between one and three content biases (Stubbersfield et al., 2017) so this low degree of change reflects what 
is observed in ‘real world’ material. Future research should examine the effect of multiple biases by examin-
ing which combination of biases make a narrative more memorable and more transmittable, and whether a 
large number of biases actually make material less transmissible. 
The finding that the exploit-high group did not increase in any biases (although MCI content was added 
to a number of versions) can be explained in a number of ways. First, the participants may not be skilled in 
creatively making stories that already exploited biases even more entertaining. Altering a narrative that may 
already be successful in transmission so that it is even more appealing to an audience could be a challenge 
and in a real environment only the most successful versions would be selected for transmission by readers. 
A second explanation draws on a methodological issue. The use of a Likert scale to assess the content means 
that material which already scored high on this scale had less opportunity to increase after transmission. 
This study is the first to examine how transmission without recall, allowing participants to deliberately 
alter the material however the wish, may reflect cognitive content biases found in recall-based transmission. 
As such it is also the first study to explicitly examine content biases in intentional guided variation. Previous 
research by Mesoudi (2008) compared arrow-head designs produced through context bias and through 
guided variation and found that under certain circumstances guided variation can produce similar outcomes 
to cultural transmission. This study found that guided variation is effective in increasing the degree to which 
material exploits content biases to some extent but only when the original material does not exploit biases to 
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a great extent. Only the suggested content biases of social information and MCI were found to be increased. 
No other content biases were increased. Unlike recall-based experiments where aspects of material either 
are retained or degrade, here new material was introduced increasing the number of biases that material 
may exploit. Material which already exploits biases to a greater degree was found not to be enhanced by 
guided variation. The results of this study suggest the importance of both deliberate changes and selection 
in the evolution of a culturally successful narrative as intentional guided variation alone appears not to 
enhance narratives to any great degree in terms of their exploitation of content biases. 
As with many other studies in this field (and more broadly in the social sciences), the participants recruited 
were from a WEIRD population (Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic, see Henrich, Heine, 
& Norenzayan, 2010) and could be considered to be broadly homogenous, especially when compared to 
humans as a whole. We are therefore limited in terms of how various individual, demographic and contex-
tual variations may influence these results. We acknowledge this as a limitation of the current study in terms 
of representation and generalisability, especially as electronic communication and the issue of misinforma-
tion online is particularly global in scope. Future research should endeavour to recruit participants from a 
wider pool to enhance representation. Further, while the present experimental approach has advantages in 
terms of internal comparison and confounding variable control, the examination of ‘creative transmission’ 
could be enhanced through the qualitative and quantitative examination of extant datasets of electronic 
communication, which could be then compared to experimental results while offering insights into contex-
tual factors. 
Future research could address these issues more directly by using the same material in both intentional 
modification transmission chains and traditional recall-based transmission chains. Further, it would be 
interesting to examine the modifications at each generation, to assess trends in the changes made to stories, 
rather than simply the total cumulative effects examined here. Additionally, future research should examine 
the effects of motivation on this process as perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the alterations 
made to electronic material when it is transmitted is why some would change it at all, rather than simply 
forwarding it or choosing not to transmit it. With specific audiences or motivations in mind the creative 
changes made by participants could be very different to those made in this study. In particular, how the 
cognitive biases examined here may interact with the political or ideological biases examined in other fields 
of cultural science would be a valuable avenue of future research. For instance by examining if content 
biases in guided variation operate differently on material reflecting one’s own ideological biases compared 
to martial which opposes them. Further, with reference to motivations and concepts of audience, it would 
be interesting to examine how the alterations made by individuals trained in creative arts or journalism 
differ from those who do not possess such training. Another potential avenue for future research would be 
to examine the interaction between the choose-to-receive phase of transmission and guided variation in 
transmission so as to investigate the roles of both selective and mutational processes in cultural evolution. 
This study represents a first attempt to empirically examine how individual cognitive processes can result 
in population patterns in electronic communication. This area of research is vital as, while data science 
approaches such as Vosoughi, Roy and Aral (2018) can give fascinating insights into the nature of largescale 
patterns they are limited in answering how and why these patterns emerge. The findings here suggest that 
when the story in question already exploits content biases it may not be modified in electronic transmis-
sion and will be preserved. However, if someone feels motivated to transmit a story which does not appear 
to exploit content biases, it may be modified to gain greater appeal, likely through the inclusion of content 
to appeal to social bias, as such its accuracy may be lost. This study provides, therefore, provides a useful 
insight into how misinformation online could be produced through mutational cultural evolution, such as 
through intentional guided variation, and what direction these changes are likely to take. As such it gives 
greater understanding of an element of the wider phenomenon of online false news and misinformation.
Additional Files
The additional files for this article can be found as follows:
• SM 1. News stories used as original material. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/csci.109.s1
• SM 2. Questions used in questionnaires for Stage 1 and Stage 3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/csci.109.s1
• SM 3. Table showing the significant mean differences between each news story before transmission (at 
p < .05). DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/csci.109.s1
• SM 4. Table showing the significant mean differences between each news story after transmission (at 
p < .05). DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/csci.109.s1
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